Since September 18th 2011 the city of Berlin is under attack by a small, but focused group of pirates: in a non-expected coup, the local branch of the Pirate Party collected 8,9% of the votes and captured 15 seats in the Abgeordnetenhaus. After a period of rather moderate success at the polls, the youngest addition to the party landscape in Germany found itself catapulted into the center of public discussion on the future of politics. The success of "political nerds" and "digital natives" was considered to be a welcome antidote in times of ageing parties and general political fatigue. As the German Pirate Party is only five years old and had no parliamentary experience until now, a number of questions come into mind: is the rise of the pirates sustainable or just an ephemeral phenomenon? What are the reasons for their success? Under which conditions can digital campaign activity be converted into analog party-building? Are there any consequences for the political system as a whole?
The following article roughly describes the emergence of the German Pirate Party in its current form during the public argument about blocking access to the Internet in 2009. Since then, membership growth and moderate electoral success led to a stabilization of the Pirate Party. The rather unexpected victory in Berlin seems to have unlocked new energy – with almost 20.000 members at the end of 2011 the organization is considered to be in play at least until the next federal election in 2013.
Organizational Structure and Membership Development
The German Pirate Party ("Piratenpartei Deutschland", www.piratenpartei.de) was founded in September 2006, as a reaction to the formation of the Swedish "Piratpartiet" earlier that year. "Pirates" were to be seen at the polls for the first time during the state elections in Hesse in January 2008, gathering only a very slight share of the vote (0,2%). A broader public got to know the party during 2009 – a first key moment was the election to the European Parliament on June 7th. With a total of 229.464 votes and a 0,9% share the Piratenpartei managed to become visible as a "small" or "minor party" (Kleinpartei) within the German party system which is dominated by four parties only (or five, taking into account the Linkspartei, which is only effective in some regions). During the media coverage of the European Election, German pirates took advantage of the relative success of their Swedish sister party, which gained 7,1% of the vote, thus being able to send their first representatives to Strasbourg.
Elections were not the only way for Pirates to catch the attention of the public and the press. In Germany the "#Zensursula"-campaign and an Electronic Petition to the Bundestag labeled "Internet – No Indication and Blocking of Websites" created a broader interest. The petition was neither submitted by a member nor a committee of the Pirate Party. Nevertheless, a connection was made, mostly because of the adjacency of the debate about blocking websites to the Internet-related political ambitions and postulations of a new organization on the rise.
The mutual reinforcement of petition #Zensursula-campaign and party activities reached its peak in the week of 15th to 20th June 2009. On Tuesday, 16th, the subscription period of the Electronic Petition ended, a total number of 134.015 people signing it generated an intense media coverage. Despite this huge public uproar, only two days later the great coalition approved the "Zugangserschwerungsgesetz" (ZugErschwG), which contained regulations for blocking websites. The turbulent week came to a close on Saturday, when in numerous German cities demonstrations were held, their common slogan was: «Löschen statt Sperren» ("delete instead of block"). Fueling public attention and media coverage, former SPD-representative Jörg Tauss utilized the Berlin demonstration for staging his party exit and conversion to the Piratenpartei. Until the end of the legislative period he claimed to be the first German «pirate in parliament»[1].
Watching the membership growth closely, it´s easy to detect the main phases of attraction and inflow which were essential for the organizational development of the Piratenpartei. By now, four phases can be determined:
After the founding of the Pirate Party in 2006 as an echo to the success of the Swedish relative, there were only a couple of hundred activists formally organized. For two years, the pirates remained in a very small niche and did not gain broad public attention. A first, yet weak dynamic started in the wake of the trial against Swedish website "Pirate Bay" in spring 2008, by far not comparable to the growth of membership in the Swedish Pirate Party at the same time. By now it seems clear, for the transition to the first phase of rapid membership growth the approval of the "Zugangserschwerungsgesetz" by the Bundestag has been the crucial moment. It is responsible for a membership explosion turning the Piratenpartei from a niche phenomenon with 1000 members in January 2009 into Germany´s fifth largest party organization with almost 12.000 members at the end of the same year. Thus, the graph shows its biggest slope not immediately after the European Elections on June 7th, but in the memorable week described above with the acclamation of the bill on blocking websites, public demonstrations and the conversion of Jörg Tauss.
During the following weeks, party activities concentrated on formally applying to the national election, which first of all meant collecting signatures to show support within the citizenry. Relevant milestones were the approval of the party by the federal election agency on July 17th 2009, as well as gathering support for candidates on regional and local level. Decisions on the admittance for the election in September were made on July 31st 2009 by different agencies on the respective administrative level. Party activists utilized this process of seeking societal support as a preliminary stage of the official election campaign – thus the Piratenpartei was able to prolong this important phase of self-construction.
The phase of rapid growth came to a halt in late 2009. During the following two years the Pirate Party managed to stabilize its size at around 12.000 members. In the meantime, the party took part in a number of elections on state and local level – with rather moderate success. In every state election the votes for the pirates never significantly exceeded the numbers of the election to the Bundestag[2]. The organizational development mirrored this process of a slow-down: those regional party branches which organized state level campaigns where able to recruit new members, while branches without electoral activities were confronted with slightly shrinking membership rates.
Things changed rapidly with the state election in Berlin coming up in fall 2011, when membership numbers began to rise with an epicenter in Germany´s capital city. The recognition of the Pirate Party as a relevant force in state politics came into sight by increasing numbers in the pre-election polls. About a month before the election on September 18th 2011, pirates came close to or even surpassed the 5%-barrier, formal access limit to the Abgeordnetenhaus. After receiving a 8,9% share of the vote and sending 15 representatives to the Berlin State Parliament[3], the Pirate Party saw their membership numbers explode – during the following three months almost 7.000 new pirates joined the organization, expanding the party structure to around 18.000 members (current numbers are provided at http://wiki.piratenpartei.de/Mitglieder).
Especially this last phase can be marked as a kind of "unhealthy growth" - as it is a common idea of the pirates not to apply a system of inner-party hierarchies (such as organizational branches below state-level) or to install a delegate system for representation at party meetings, the party seems difficult to manage. Still, there are no professional office structures throughout the country with pirates managing local and regional membership communication on a voluntary basis. By now, only the parliamentary group in Berlin is able to finance professional structures of work, whereas the rest of the party organization, also on national level, remains in a state of "engaged amateurism". Yet, this situation seems to be everything but dysfunctional: the party is in good condition and was able to organize a productive and well-recognized national convention on December 3rd and 4th in the city of Offenbach. Around 1.300 members of the party discussed on central ideas of the party program and decided on additions to the general program, such as unconditional basic income, church-state separation, or the legalization of soft drugs.
Why Berlin?
The dynamics of the "Super Election Year" (Superwahljahr 2009) were followed by a two-year long phase of relative stability well below the 5%-barrier, which is in Germany an essential value for assessing the potential and effectiveness of political parties. With every state election since 2009, political analysts critically reviewed the electoral "underperformance" of the Pirate Party. Obviously being misled by the surprising success of 2009, journalists and scientist alike had expected the young party to constantly increase their share of the vote. After the disappointing results in Northrine-Westfalia (1,6%), Hamburg (2,1%), Saxonia-Anhalt (1,4%), Rhineland-Palatinate (1,6%), Baden-Württemberg (2,1%), Bremen (1,9%), and Mecklenburg-Pomerania (1,9%) the upcoming Berlin election was considered to be a crucial one: since the established parties slowly modernize their internet agenda and re-arrange the personal line-up by awarding young, ascending politicians with the responsibility for "online issues", the Pirate Party seemed to be in need for an electoral success. Otherwise, analysts suggested, the still fragile membership structure might collapse as well as a "brain-drain" with the brightest heads turning to maybe the Green Party or Social Democrats would be possible (not so much to the Liberal Democrats because of their steady decline in voter and public support).
And then the Pirates took Berlin, with an astonishing 8,9% share of the vote.
In total, 130.105 voters casted their ballot in favor of the Pirate Party. The Chief Election Officer sums up: «The Pirate Party had their best result among voters younger than 25 years, with a 16,8% share of the vote. From this age onwards, the share of the vote decreased with every cohort to only 3,6% among senior citizens, aged 60 years and up. Among the supporters of the Pirate Party, the group of male voters (11,4%) is significantly bigger than the group of female voters (6,3%)»[4]. This outstanding performance in the still young history of Germany´s Pirate Party not only boosted their presence in the mainstream media, furthermore it secured the position of the party within the German political landscape. The almost immediate result of rapidly rising membership numbers seemed to further stabilize the party structures, even if challenging its unfinished organizational status. By being able to work from within a state parliament, the party should be able to consolidate its visibility in the broader public. In turn, this process of professionalization might help to continue the built-up of robust inner-organizational structures with a perspective towards the upcoming federal elections in 2013.
With hindsight, several reasons led to the unexpected electoral success of the Pirate Party.
At first, the city of Berlin is the center of the newly developing policy area of "internet politics" or "digital civil rights". Many of the relevant political actors in this increasingly public debate are based in Berlin, i.e. the Parliamentary Commission on "Internet and Digital Society" (www.bundestag.de/internetenquete), the recently formed lobbying/activist group "Digitale Gesellschaft" ("Digital Society", www.digitalegesellschaft.de) or the famous "Chaos Computer Club" (www.ccc.de). Although "digital civil rights" usually is not a relevant issue for regional and state elections, it played a significant role during the election campaign because of its visibility throughout the city of Berlin.
Secondly, the Pirate Party managed to be recognized as an alternative to the established political parties in Berlin. Their focus on issues related to new technologies helped to create a fresh and modern image as well as their will to experiment with tools like blogs, social networks, or voice-chat for internal discussions. In addition to that, the Pirates emphasized their favor of grassroots democracy and resisted (at least until now) the development of inner-party-elites. They gather a variety of young, formerly not politically active citizens, and display this ability by nominating a set of young (yet mostly male) candidates. With limited personal or financial resources, the "Pirates" engaged in a "Do-it-Yourself"-Campaign and developed creative and cost-sensitive strategies for gaining attention, online and on the streets.
A third reason for the extraordinary electoral strength of this very young party organization might be the downfall of the Liberal Democrats (FDP) under Federal Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle and Philipp Rösler, his successor as chairman of the party. While the FDP dropped in the Berlin polls under the margin of 5%, the Pirate Party rose as a "viable" alternative for undecided or discontent voters. To protest against the city´s party establishment, voters turned their heads to the Pirate Party instead of the FDP, recognizing them as a possible choice on the left side of the political spectrum. In addition to that, the Green party did not manage to attract as many student voters as in the years before, while simultaneously blaming the Pirate Party for their own decline of support. Leading candidate Renate Künast was of no help for her campaign, when taunting the new competitor with the statement «also pirates can be re-socialized» – instead, the low-budget campaign of the Pirate Party gained a lot of media coverage by being accepted as a real threat to the established parties.
Future Perspectives
The Pirate Party is facing a number of challenges in the time remaining until the next federal election scheduled for 2012. First, they have to guarantee a professional performance of the Party´s most visible section with parliamentary access in Berlin. The 15 representatives have to prove their ability to function within the structures of an established political actor while not leaving behind their origins in the decentralized and lively but chaotic digital culture. A good, silent and – at best – effective performance would benefit the party as a whole and could strengthen their image as a serious addition to the German political landscape.
Until now, there is only the state election in Schleswig-Holstein scheduled for 2012 (May 6th), which would leave a reasonable amount of time to consolidate inner-party structures. Also, there is enough room for internal debates about the party program – a main part would be the decision whether to concentrate on internet-related issues or to broaden the agenda similarly to the established rivals. Within this process, the development and deployment of digital structures for internal communication might be essential for differentiation from their competitors. It is a key question for the future, if the Pirate Party will be able to make use of digital media platforms for collective text-editing or software like "Adhocracy"[5] to organize deliberation in internal discussion processes. Once they can prove their specific mode of "digital democracy" functional for the establishment of a new party formation inside the traditionally conservative German party system, there might be good chances to continue their campaign by capturing a number of seats in the Bundestag.
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